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1. Introduction 
The government’s choice of certain level of integration depends principally on 
impact of integration process on development of national economy. That is, the rational 
government’s behavior with regard to joining to certain trade agreement is conditioned 
both by maximization of efficiency of potential possibilities and minimization of 
related risks for domestic economy. 
Tariff and export taxes as other taxes are used in order to achieve both fiscal and 
regulatory goals in the area of international trade, i.e. to provide tax revenue from 
external economic activity (commodities imports and exports) and to regulate flows of 
commodities sold to other countries and bought in other states. 
It should be noted that problems, concerning trade regulation through the use of 
trade taxes are typical firstly for weak and/or authoritarian economies. Governments 
of developed market economies generally do not face the centralized regulation of 
commodity flows. 
Such conditions determine different types of government behavior: to reduce (or 
to eliminate) export taxes on primary and raw-materials in order to develop appropriate 
export-oriented industries and to provide currency earnings, or to use tariff regulation 
in order to promote both the use of resources in the domestic economy and production 
with high value-added. 
The trade of developing and transition countries is characterized by export 
orientation (there are some exceptions, e.g. the North Korea), the lack of resources for 
domestic production, the little value-added and relatively low quality of goods. All this 
leads to the low competitiveness of such goods in the world market. 
Consequently the most part of goods, produced in these countries, becomes 
competitive in the world markets contingent upon low price, and therefore upon its low 
profitability. In turn, this low profitability leads to the risk of the failure of the foreign 
trade activity of companies in transition countries, to its dependence from additional 
costs in the process of sales, notably, whether there is a double taxation in exporting 
countries, from the level of the tax burden in them, and also whether there are export 
taxes (in exporting countries) and import tariffs (in importing countries). 
Now Ukrainian government set a course for Ukraine’s joining to European 
Union (hereafter EU); notably, it elaborated the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to 
prepare and facilitate the implementation of the Association Agreement for 2014-2017. 
Also main directions of sectoral coordination are agreed, new conditions of Ukraine-
EU commodity trade are defined, particularly the unilateral reduction or elimination of 
the EU customs duties for commodities originating in Ukraine in the framework of 
Autonomous Preferential Trade Regime (hereafter APTR). 
But now Ukraine imposes several export taxes, primarily, on raw materials 
(ferrous and non-ferrous scrap metals, sunflower seeds etc.), and their share in the total 
trade tax revenue is negligible (less than 5% of total revenue). At the same time, despite 
that EU countries starting from May 2014 have eliminated a substantial part of import 
tariffs applied to goods originating in Ukraine (under provisions of Autonomous 
preferential trade regime (Sokolovska, 2016), Ukraine’s exports which is subject of the 
import tariffs in destination countries is about 50% of total country’s exports. 
According to the trade theory the reduction of a tariff ceteris paribus leads to the 
increase of commodity flows. Taking into account that now raw materials and 
intermediate products consist a large part of Ukrainian export to the EU, the reduction 
or elimination of import tariffs could lead to the increase of their exports, therefore 
favoring to recognizing Ukraine as net exporter of raw materials and semi-finished 
goods. This is the case firstly for agricultural goods (which, however, are regulated by 
EU by non-tariff measures, notably, quotas), and also for output of mining and 
processing industries and metallurgy. Notably, a considerable part of Ukrainian 
metallurgical export to the EU, consists of raw materials and unfinished goods, which 
are processed later on European plants in order to create high value added production. 
But in current economic environment government’s behavior should be focused on 
departure from the image of raw materials exporting country since such economic 
policy is no longer effective. 
But in real economic conditions when commodity flows are influenced by other 
factors along with tariffs, tariffs (as distorting element) could not be the main reason 
of changes of commodity flows. In this context tariffs could be eliminated in order to 
reduce their distorting effects in international trade. 
So, the government faces the problem of defining the level of the tax (customs) 
burden, taking into account that the heavier is the tax burden the higher is budget 
revenues, proceeded from both exports and imports, but the lesser are their volumes. 
The latter, firstly, narrows an external trade of the country, and secondly due to 
narrowing of the tax base as a result nevertheless could lead to the reduction of budget 
revenues. Otherwise, the reduction of the tax (customs) burden could also lead to the 
reduction of budget revenues despite the enlarging of the tax base. 
The reasonability of applying customs duties for goods with different elasticities 
(both for monopoly markets and markets closer to perfect competition) are considered 
in Sokolovskyi & Sokolovska (2011). The obtained results could be enlarged for 
different types of the world market demand on certain goods, notably, the high level of 
demand could be considered as similar to the monopoly industry while the low level 
of demand – as similar to the industry, closer to perfect competition. 
So, the main purpose of the paper is to determine the most efficient government 
trade behavior by defining elements of such behavior and their conformity to certain 
economic framework, and by determining whether commodity exports are sensitive to 
reduction or elimination of tariffs (as in the case of Ukrainian exports and EU import 
duties). 
To do this we structured paper as follows. Section 2 reviews main theoretical 
and empirical research on the trade policy and government behavior. Section 3 
provides brief theoretical background of use of trade taxes and non-tariff barriers. 
Section 4 describes both methodology and theoretical model. Section 5 provides an 
empirical estimation of sensitivity of commodity exports to the reduction of tariffs with 
discussion of obtained results. Finally, Section 6 presents some concluding remarks. 
2. Literature review 
Theoretical background of trade policy and government behavior could be found 
in Calmfors & Horn (1986), Kerr & Gaisford (2007), Mansfield & Milner (2012), 
Mahrenbach (2013), etc. 
The largest part of research studies the impact of trade policy on economic 
growth. See for example Krueger (1974), Rivera & Romer (1991), Lundstrom (2003), 
Mahmood (2014) etc. These papers typically use a panel data in order to investigate 
such impact. Generally, they conclude that trade policy is highly significant for the 
economic growth. Another set of papers studies government trade policy in free trade 
agreements (e.g. see Bagwell & Staiger (2003), Ethier (2004, 2007), Ludema & Mayda 
(2013), Grossman & Horn (2013), Saggi et al. (2015) etc.). 
Studies of government economic behavior, taking into account economic, 
political and institutional factors in the trade policy, deserve a special mention. 
Grossman & Helpman (1994) developed a model in which special-interest 
groups make political contributions aimed to influence on government’s trade policy, 
studying the structure of trade protection arising in the political equilibrium. They 
conclude that the protection provided to all politically organized industries increases 
with the relative weight that the government devotes to campaign contributions vis-à-
vis voter welfare, and, falls with the fraction of voters, belonging to an organized lobby 
group. Further Gawande & Magee (2012) have introduced into Grossman-Helpman 
model the possibility of free-riding in a way that allows industries to be partially 
organized, having made a distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative 
lobbying. They found that free-riding reduces the estimated weight on social welfare 
in the policy maker utility function. And thus the free-rider problem could help explain 
why many advanced countries have low trade barriers despite having politicians who 
are less than saints. 
Gawande et al. (2009) examined quantitatively the welfare-mindedness of 
governments, having observed government. They conclude that political institutions 
having a larger number of checks and balances embedded in the trade policy decisions, 
together with economic growth, cause more welfare minded governments. Both the 
degree of urbanization and the degree of competition are also important determinants 
of the weight governments put on social welfare in the decision making process. 
Further authors continued to study this problem by evaluating the relative importance 
of three factors that motivate redistributive government behavior: tariff revenues, 
consumer welfare, and producer profits. Using tariff data from 40 countries, they found 
that developing countries with weak tax systems often weigh tariff revenue heavily, 
while more developed countries weigh producer interests the most (Gawande et al. 
2015). 
Mansfield & Milner (2014) studied government behavior in preferential trade 
agreements. They supposed that political leaders can gain from such agreements 
because of the signals they send to their publics and the more democratic their political 
system is, the more they can gain from implementing trade agreements. Stoyanov & 
Yildiz (2015) analyzed the government behavior in preferential and multilateral trade 
agreements when they choose whether to participate in preferential or multilateral trade 
agreements under political pressures from domestic special interest groups. They 
conclude that heterogeneity in political preferences across countries plays an important 
role in determining government trade policy. 
 
  
 3. Methodology and theoretical model 
Nigel A. Chalk (Chalk, 2001) analyzed classical graphical model of conditions 
of increasing the tax revenue due to the reduction of the tax burden. Fig. 1 presents the 
extended Chalk’s (2001), graph for convenience is oppositely “rotated”, notably, the 
profitability of investors is situated on the X-axis in ascending (but not in descending) 
order. 
Figure 1. Revenue of investors and government revenue in cases of standard and 
reduced tariff rate 
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Fig. 1 shows the dependence both of revenues of investors and government 
revenue from different tax (customs) burden, faced by investors. The reduction of the 
tax burden generally leads to the enlargement of the tax base (increase of investment), 
but in is not necessarily the case that such enlargement will lead to the increase of 
budget revenue. According to the logics, the basic principles of which are substantiated 
by Laffer (Trabandt, 2011), for defined distribution of companies’ profitability 
(industries) there is a critical value of the tax burden, at which the budget revenues are 
highest. If the level of the tax burden exceeds the mentioned critical value, then its 
reduction (to the critical value as well) leads to the increase of budget revenues. 
Consequently the levels of the tax burden less than critical values unambiguously lead 
to the reduction of budget revenues. 
In the closed form we obtained conditions under which the introduction of tax 
incentive regime could increase or reduce the tax revenue. 
Let’s define the tariff revenue both in cases of standard (τ) and reduced (τ–Δτ) 
rates. According to the functions presented on Fig. 1, when the standard tariff (τ) rate 
applies the revenue which exceeds the level of the simple reproduction 
   01y x yt   is received by investors which are situated in the interval 
 
0
1;1
p
x
k t
 
 
 
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Under the conditions of tax incentive regime (τ–Δτ), the number of investors 
receiving the revenue which exceeds the level of the simple reproduction, increases to 
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, but the amount of the tariff paid by them reduces to the 
  y x t t D . Thus we have an oppositely directed dynamics of two multipliers which 
compose the total amount of the tariff revenue. Consequently whether the tariff 
reduction will increase the revenue depends on the concrete values of concrete 
variables. Diagrammatically on Fig. 1 the tariff revenue under standard rate design is 
defined by the total area of B and C sectors, and under tax incentive regime – by the 
total area of A and B sectors, respectively. The sector B is common to both designs, so 
the increase of revenue due to introduction of tax incentive regime, compared to the 
standard one, denotes the larger area of the sector A, compared to the sector C. 
Formally, it can be written as. 
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where p0 is the level of simple reproduction; 
 p x  is the productivity of investment in economy, ranked according to the higher 
values; 
p–1 is the function, inverse to p; 
x1 is the highest level of normalized profitability (in industry or region). 
In order that the expansion of foreing trade will lead to the tariff revenue, the 
satisfaction of the condition    P Pt t t  D  is needed, i.e. the fulfillment of the 
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even the expansion of foreign trade will not compensate the reduction of the tariff 
burden and will lead to the reduction of budget revenues. 
The more detailed analysis of both standard and tax incentive regimes is 
presented in Sokolovska & Sokolovskyi (2015). For this study it is necessary to 
understand that the level of tariff reduction should be clearly defined, and if it is not 
possible, the industries should be categorized by their productivity in order to provide 
reduced tariff rates for the appropriate companies, which otherwise could curtail their 
production. 
4. Empirical estimation 
Let’s briefly consider current situation with tariff regulation in Ukraine-EU 
commodity trade. 
Now Ukraine applies import duties (general, reduced and preferential) for 
products originating in EU. Starting from May 2014 EU provided Ukraine the 
autonomous trade preferences in view of the security, political and economic 
challenges faced by Ukraine, and in order to support country’s economy. Previously, 
EU governments applied import duties according Council Regulation (EC) 
№1186/2009 at rates common for all third countries. 
Late in April 2014 EU provided Ukraine the APTR, involving the unilateral 
reduction or elimination of EU customs duties on goods originating in Ukraine: on 
April 16, 2014 the EU Council adopted an appropriate decision and on April 22, 2014 
an appropriate Regulation of European Parliament and of the Council was published in 
the Official Journal of the European Union. 
This Regulation (2014) provides that the appliance of the autonomous trade 
preferences started May 2014 and lasted until November 2014. Effective as of 
introduction of APTR, EU governments set import duties at the level of the first year 
after coming in force the Agreement of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(hereafter DCFTA) between Ukraine and EU. 
In the framework of tariff and non-tariff regulation this proposal concerned the 
following commodities. 
1. Industrial Products. Existing EU tariffs for industrial goods exported from Ukraine 
were removed immediately for 94,7% of commodities. For the remaining handful 
of products (some chemical products, etc.) tariffs were reduced. 
2. Agricultural Products. For agricultural goods, the EU has taken important but more 
limited action to open up its market to Ukrainian agriculture in order to ensure the 
European agricultural sector is not harmed by this unilateral trade action. Notably, 
the EU granted immediate and unlimited preferences to 82,2% of Ukraine's exports. 
For the other products (cereals, pork, beef, poultry and a handful of additional 
products) a partial liberalization was achieved by the granting of duty-free tariff rate 
quotas (hereafter TRQs), which limit the amount of certain goods able to benefit 
from the trade preference. 
3. Processed food products. The EU granted immediate preferences to 83,4% of 
Ukraine's exports. The remaining 15,9% were partially liberalized through TRQs. 
On September, 2014 the implementation of statements of Ukraine-EU 
Association Agreement (2013), related to the DCFTA was postponed to the beginning 
of 2016. At the same time the APTR was unilaterally extended to the December 31, 
2015. This means that after January 1, 2016 the import duty rates applied by EU 
governments to products originating in Ukraine, remained unchanged. Ukrainian 
government, in return, will start the gradual reduction of import duties for goods 
originating in EU in order to allow domestic economic agents to adjust to the new 
competitive conditions. The transition period will be 3-10 years, for automotive 
industry – 15 years. 
4.1. Data and econometric methodology 
In order to estimate the impact of unilateral reduction of import duties by EU 
governments on Ukrainian export flows we provide econometrical and statistical 
analysis. 
As main indicators we’ve chosen the following commodities, according to 
current Ukrainian Classification of Commodities for Foreign Economic Activity. 
1. Sunflower oil. 
2. Crude oil. 
3. Pig iron. 
4. Steam boilers. 
5. Boilers for district heating (except steam boilers). 
6. Electrical generator units. 
7. Electrical generators (except electrical generator units). 
8. Electrical transformers. 
Main criteria in order to choose commodities for further analysis include: 
change of import duty in the framework of APTR; 
absence of import quotas applied by EU; 
considerable (no less than 10%) part of export in the commodity group (according to 
Ukrainian Classification of Commodities for Foreign Economic Activity) – only for 
commodities with reduced or eliminated rates of import duty; 
availability of relevant statistical data concerning sales, exports and world prices; 
diversity of commodities: products of mining and processing industries; metallurgy; 
machinery. 
We provided a two-stage analysis. On the first stage we tested individual 
statistical dependencies between target parameter (Ukraine’s commodity exports to 
EU) and independent parameters (tariff rate in EU countries, world market prices, rate 
of exchange, etc.). On the second stage we used non-linear multiply regression with 
normal distribution and power link function. 
According to the available data we provide analysis for the short (2013-2014) 
and medium term (2013-2015). 
The weighted average import duty rate (before reduction) was calculated 
according to the WTO (2012) methodology. 
Considering that in 2014-2015 heavily due to geopolitical problems there was 
general country’s economic fall, notably, in industrial sector. In order to obtain more 
relevant results we normalized the commodity sales and commodity exports on the 
index of industrial output in USD (taking into account the dynamics of currency rate).  
Firstly, we calculated individual statistical relationships. A significant 
correlation was determined for sunflower oil, crude oil and pig iron (Table 1.) 
Table 1. Statistical relationships between exports and tariff rates and rate of exchange 
for sunflower oil, crude oil and pig iron in the short-run 
Commodity Tariff rate Rate of exchange UAH/$USD 
Sunflower oil –0,716 0,761 
Crude oil –0,708 0,571 
Pig iron –0,091 0,341 
Pig iron5,25 –0,739 0,877 
Data analysis proved that exports of sunflower oil is significantly correlated with 
both tariff rate (direct correlation) and rate of exchange (inverse correlation); that does 
not run counter to economic sense: reduction of tariff rate and increase of rate of 
exchange, ceteris paribus, lead to increase of exporters’ total revenue from exports and 
their revenue in national currency, respectively. So, exports become more profitable in 
both of these cases. 
The inverse correlation in the short run is also observed for crude oil exports and 
tariff rate, while the significant correlation with rate of exchange is absent. The reason 
is that the crude oil does not need further processing, and, consequently, the semi-
finished products, wage payments for workers, employed in processing, and any other 
expenditures made on the customs territory of Ukraine in its national currency. 
There is no significant statistical relationship between exports of pig iron and 
tariff rates. Geopolitical problems in Ukraine and current situation in the Donbass 
region, where the most of Ukrainian metallurgical plants are situated, determined the 
decrease in metallurgy industry, which was significantly more, than in the whole 
economy. This factor, in turn, determined the decrease of metallurgy exports, which 
could not be compensated even by elimination of tariffs. But, however, there is some 
impact of the latter factor. Thus, the exports, normalized on power function of 
industrial production index (optimal value of power for the available data is 5,25) 
demonstrates sufficient correlation (-0,74) with tariff rate (Fig. 2). 
Figure 2. Graphical collocation of tariff rates and pig iron exports (in both absolute 
and normalized values) 
 
For machinery production (steam boilers, boilers for district heating (except 
steam boilers), electrical generator units, electrical generators (except electrical 
generator units), electrical transformers) the correlation was insignificant (less than 
0,7), so we provide further analysis only for three strategically important commodities: 
sunflower oil, crude oil and pig iron. 
In order to analyze in more detail the impact of different factors on commodity 
exports we applied non-linear multiple regression models. 
In these models we used both linear and power link functions; the latter generally 
is better to model economic processes in emerging economies. For calculations we 
used STATISTICA 10 Enterprise tools. 
4.2. Empirical results and discussion 
Fig. 3 presents an example of results of calculations for sunflower oil for the 
short term in Statistica 10 (significant factors are highlighted in red), while the Table 
2 the results of calculations for sunflower oil for both short and medium term 
(significant factors are italicized). 
Figure. 3. Results of estimation of impact of different factors on sunflower oil 
exports for the short term (Statistica 10, screenshot). 
 
 
Table 2. Results of estimation of impact of different factors on sunflower oil exports 
in the short and medium term 
  Short-term Medium-term 
 
Degr. of – 
Freedom 
Wald – Stat. p Wald – Stat. p 
Intercept 1 0,33899 0,560412 0,257233 0,612027 
Currency, USD/UAH 1 1,91789 0,166090 4,298719 0,038141 
Currency, 
USD/UAH^2 
1 1,39716 0,237200 2,012563 0,156002 
Sunflower seeds, mln. 
tons 
1 1,24963 0,263623 0,025371 0,873446 
Sunflower seeds, 
mln.tons^2 
1 6,37187 0,011594 0,003967 0,949779 
Sunflower oil, 
production, thous. 
tons 
1 0,00037 0,984623 7,936171 0,004846 
Sunflower oil, 
production, thous. 
tonnes^2 
1 0,03402 0,853662 4,841960 0,027775 
Tariff rate 1 15,19356 0,000097 0,900523 0,342641 
Tariff rate^2 1 7,04453 0,007951 0,805359 0,369496 
Sunflower oil, prices, 
US$ per metric ton 
1 1,48103 0,223613 1,234189 0,266594 
Sunflower oil, prices, 
US$ per metric ton^2 
1 1,59657 0,206391 0,985025 0,320961 
We included into analysis of sunflower oil exports the sunflower plantings, since 
sunflower seeds are the main component of sunflower oil production, moreover 
Ukraine does not import them. The non-linear multiple regression model was built 
providing both normal distribution and power link function. 
The analysis of regression results with Wald-test (WaldStat.)1 showed the 
significance of only tariff rate parameter; confidence interval (p) is within tolerance 
(р<0,05). 
In estimating the impact of different factors on Ukrainian crude oil exports to the 
EU, it has been found that in this case coefficients at non-linear terms of regression 
equation are set to zero. So, we decide to apply linear multiple regression with normal 
distribution and power link function. The results in both short and medium term are 
presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Results of estimation of impact of different factors on crude oil exports in 
the short and medium term 
  Short-term Medium-term 
 
Degr. of – 
Freedom 
Wald – Stat. p Wald – Stat. p 
Intercept 1 1,037588 0,308383 0,718919 0,396499 
Crude oil, 
production, thous. 
tons 
1 0,531773 0,465863 0,093572 0,759684 
Tariff rate 1 7,816181 0,005178 0,264736 0,606885 
Crude Oil, Price 
index, simple average 
of three spot prices: 
DB, WTI, DF 
1 2,962453 0,085219 2,139687 0,143531 
Currency USD/UAH 1 0,004006 0,949536 7,027404 0,008027 
                                           
1Wald statistics (Wald test) is a parametrical statistical test used for testing hypotheses, related to the 
estimation of parameters of probability (stochastic) models, obtained based on sample data. 
Typically the Wald testis used to estimate the coefficient of independent variable in nonlinear 
regression model. If such coefficient equals to zero, the model becomes constant, and if no, then 
the Wald test allows to define if this difference is significant. Critical value for the Wald test equals 
to the “chi-squared” criterion (χ²-distribution) with one degree of freedom. 
The regression results showed that in the short run the factor which has the 
significant impact on crude oil exports is the tariff rate, while in the medium term only 
the currency factor is significant. 
In estimating the impact of different factors on pig iron exports with both linear 
and non-linear multiple regression models we found that the effect of other factors 
neutralizes relatively modest impact of tariff rate both in the short and medium term. 
(Table 4). 
Table 4. Results or estimation or impact or different factors or pig iron exports in the 
short and medium term 
  Short-term Medium-term 
 
Degr. of – 
Freedom 
Wald – 
Stat. 
p 
Wald – 
Stat. 
p 
Intercept 1 0,53641 0,463926 0,792004 0,373495 
Currency, UAH/$USD 1 22,90290 0,000002 6,115723 0,013398 
Currency, UAH/$USD^2 1 20,23452 0,000007 4,585844 0,032237 
Pig iron, production, mln 
tons 
1 0,15892 0,690157 0,021037 0,884679 
Pig iron, production, mln 
tons^2 
1 0,09351 0,759764 0,073099 0,786876 
Pig iron, prices, $USD per 
ton 
1 0,84880 0,356891 0,637460 0,424632 
Pig iron, prices, $USD per 
ton^2 
1 0,81670 0,366146 0,456520 0,499255 
Tariff rate 1 0,14763 0,700813 0,446381 0,504059 
Tariff rate^2 1 0,15775 0,691241 0,464178 0,495678 
The obtained results under certain conditions could be extended on the whole 
metallurgy sector that, in turn, allows to conclude that trade of metallurgical products 
is influenced, principally, not by macroeconomic factors, but by internal framework in 
the industry. 
The provided analysis showed the significant dependence between exports and 
tariff rate for two commodities: sunflower oil and crude oil, both in the terms of 
individual statistical dependence and multiply regression in the short term. For the 
medium term such correlation was significant only for the sunflower oil. It can be 
explained by the fact that tariff affects continuously on exports at the same level. 
However, recently crude oil prices have been reduced considerably; that conditioned 
their significant impact on Ukrainian crude oil exports (since Ukraine has no market 
power for this commodity on world markets) in the medium term that has “overlapped” 
the impact of tariffs. 
Concerning the third commodity – the pig iron, analysis showed a relative weak 
correlation between exports and tariff rate both in the short and medium term. Because 
of geopolitical problems in Ukraine and current situation in the Donbass region, the 
decrease in metallurgy industry was significantly more, than in the whole economy, 
and this factor determined principally the decrease of metallurgy exports, which could 
not be compensated even by elimination of tariffs. But, however, we observed some 
impact of the latter factor. At once, multiply regression does not show the dependence 
of these factors. This allowed us to conclude that virtual impact of tariff rates on pig 
iron exports is relatively weak compared to other factors and they are not a crucial 
factor in defining the extent of such impact. 
Consequently, the elimination of tariffs by EU governments in the framework of 
APRT and DCFTA on primary goods and product with law value-added originating in 
Ukraine, has contributed to the increase of their exports. 
 
  
 5. Conclusion 
The analysis of advantages and disadvantages of government patterns of trade 
behavior showed that in order to regulate the small open developing economy its 
government should provide policy, based on applying of tax instruments, notably, 
tariffs; non-tariff measures in such conditions are as auxiliary tools. 
An econometric analysis provided in order to determine whether commodity 
exports are sensitive to reduction or elimination of tariffs (as in the case of Ukrainian 
exports and EU import duties) showed that now in Ukrainian economy there are 
commodities which are both sensitive and resistant to changes of tariff rates. 
The originality of paper consists in developing of model of efficient government 
behavior in trade policy decision-making depending on the framework of national 
economy; also both conditions of untimely changes of government behavior patterns 
and ineffective frameworks appeared as consequence of these changes, were defined. 
In the empirical context we determined the possibility of use of certain elements of 
government trade policy in the framework of small transition economy of Ukraine. A 
rational use of this fact could moderate the government trade policy and do not expose 
the budget to the risk in the context of changes in foreign trade activity. 
An accurate estimation of criteria of changes (depending on the economic 
framework) of behavioral pattern is quite difficult, since it is difficult to determine 
whether an economy is ready to introduce tariff or non-tariff restrictions. So, 
specification and formalization of conditions of moments of changes of strategies 
requires the further investigation. 
 
